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Policy Analysis Using DSGE 
Models: An Introduction
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
n recent years, there has been a significant evolution in 
the formulation and communication of monetary policy 
at a number of central banks around the world. Many of 
these banks now present their economic outlook and policy 
strategies to the public in a more formal way, a process 
accompanied by the introduction of modern analytical tools 
and advanced econometric methods in forecasting and policy 
simulations. Official publications by central banks that 
formally adopt a monetary policy strategy of inflation 
targeting—such as the Inflation Report issued by the Bank 
of England and the monetary policy reports issued by the 
Riksbank and Norges Bank—have progressively introduced 
into the policy process the language and methodologies 
developed in the modern dynamic macroeconomic literature.1 
The development of medium-scale DSGE (dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium) models has played a key role 
in this process.2 These models are built on microeconomic 
foundations and emphasize agents’ intertemporal choice. 
The dependence of current choices on future uncertain 
1 The Bank of England has published a quarterly Inflation Report since 1993. 
The report sets out the detailed economic analysis and inflation projections on 
which the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee bases its interest rate decisions. 
The Riksbank and Norges Bank each publish monetary policy reports three 
times a year. These reports contain forecasts for the economy and an 
assessment of the interest rate outlook for the medium term.
2 A simple exposition of this class of models can be found in Galí and Gertler 
(2007). Woodford (2003) provides an exhaustive textbook treatment.
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• Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models are playing an important role in the 
formulation and communication of monetary 
policy at many of the world’s central banks.
￿ These models, which emphasize the 
dependence of current choices on expected 
future outcomes, have moved from academic 
circles to the policymaking community—but 
they are not well known to the general public.
￿ This study adds to the understanding of the 
DSGE framework by using a small-scale 
model to show how to address specific 
monetary policy questions; the authors 
focus on the causes of the sudden pickup 
in inflation in the first half of 2004.
￿ An important lesson derived from the exercise 
is that the management of expectations can 
be a more effective tool for stabilizing inflation 
than actual movements in the policy rate; 
this result is consistent with the increasing 
focus on central bankers’ pronouncements 
of their future actions.
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outcomes makes the models dynamic and assigns a central 
role to agents’ expectations in the determination of current 
macroeconomic outcomes. In addition, the models’ general 
equilibrium nature captures the interaction between policy 
actions and agents’ behavior. Furthermore, a more detailed 
specification of the stochastic shocks that give rise to economic 
fluctuations allows one to trace more clearly the shocks’ 
transmission to the economy. 
The use of DSGE models as a potential tool for policy 
analysis has contributed to their diffusion from academic to 
policymaking circles. However, the models remain less well-
known to the general public. To broaden the understanding of 
these models, this article offers a simple illustration of how an 
estimated model in this class can be used to answer specific 
monetary policy questions. To that end, we introduce the 
structure of DSGE models by presenting a simple model, 
meant to flesh out their distinctive features. Before proceeding 
to a formal description of the optimization problems solved by 
firms and consumers, we use a simple diagram to illustrate 
the interactions among the main agents in the economy. With 
the theoretical structure in place, we discuss the features of the 
estimated model and the extent to which it approximates the 
volatility and comovement of economic time series. We also 
discuss important outcomes of the estimation—namely, the 
possibility of recovering the structural shocks that drive 
economic fluctuations as well as the historical behavior of 
variables that are relevant for policy but are not directly 
observable. We conclude by applying the DSGE tool to study 
the role of monetary policy in a recent episode of an increase in 
inflation. The lesson we emphasize is that, while they are a very 
stylized representation of the real economy, DSGE models 
provide a disciplined way of thinking about the economic 
outlook and its interaction with policy.3 
We work with a small model in order to make the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, whose basic 
contours our model shares with most DSGE specifications, 
as transparent as possible. Therefore, the model focuses on 
the behavior of only three major macroeconomic variables: 
inflation, GDP growth, and the short-term interest rate. 
3Adolfson et al. (2007) offer a more extended illustration of how DSGE models 
can be used to address questions that policymakers confront in practice. Erceg, 
Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) illustrate policy simulations with an open-economy 
DSGE model.
However, the basic framework that we present could easily 
be enriched to provide more details on the structure of the 
economy. In fact, a key advantage of DSGE models is that they 
share core assumptions on the behavior of households and 
firms, which makes them easily scalable to include details that 
are relevant to address the question at hand. Indeed, several 
extensions of the basic framework presented here have been 
developed in the literature, including the introduction of wage 
stickiness and frictions in the capital accumulation process 
(see the popular model of Smets and Wouters [2007]) and a 
treatment of wage bargaining and labor market search (Gertler, 
Sala, and Trigari 2008).4 Recently, the 2008 financial crisis has 
highlighted one key area where DSGE models must develop: 
the inclusion of a more sophisticated financial intermediation 
sector. There is a large body of work under way to model 
financial frictions within the baseline DSGE framework—work 
that is very promising for the study of financial intermediation 
as a source and conduit of shocks as well as for its implications 
for monetary policy. However, this last generation of models 
has not yet been subjected to extensive empirical analysis. 
Our study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
general structure of our model while Section 3 illustrates its 
construction from microeconomic foundations. Section 4 
briefly describes our approach to estimation and presents some 
of the model’s empirical properties. In Section 5, we use the 
model to analyze the inflationary episode of the first half of 
2004. Section 6 concludes. 
2. DSGE Models and Their 
Basic Structure
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models used for policy 
analysis share a fairly simple structure, built around three 
interrelated blocks: a demand block, a supply block, and a 
4 Some of these larger DSGE models inform policy analysis at central banks 
around the world: Smets and Wouters (2007) of the European Central Bank; 
Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2008) of the Federal Reserve System; and Adolfson 
et al. (2008) of the Riksbank.
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monetary policy equation. Formally, the equations that define 
these blocks derive from microfoundations: explicit 
assumptions about the behavior of the main economic actors 
in the economy—households, firms, and the government. 
These agents interact in markets that clear every period, which 
leads to the “general equilibrium” feature of the models. 
Section 3 presents the microfoundations of a simple DSGE 
model and derives the equations that define its equilibrium. 
But first, we begin by introducing the basic components 
common to most DSGE models with the aid of a diagram. 
In the diagram, the three interrelated blocks are depicted as 
rectangles. The demand block determines real activity   as 
a function of the ex ante real interest rate—the nominal rate 
minus expected inflation  —and of expectations about 
future real activity  . This block captures the idea that, when 
real interest rates are temporarily high, people and firms would 
rather save than consume or invest. At the same time, people 
are willing to spend more when future prospects are promising 
(  is high), regardless of the level of interest rates. 
The line connecting the demand block to the supply block 
shows that the level of activity   emerging from the demand 
block is a key input in the determination of inflation  , 
together with expectations of future inflation  . In 
prosperous times, when the level of activity is high, firms must 
increase wages to induce employees to work longer hours. 
Higher wages increase marginal costs, putting pressure on 
prices and generating inflation. Moreover, the higher inflation 
is expected to be in the future, the higher is this increase in 
prices, thus contributing to a rise in inflation today. 
The determination of output and inflation from the 
demand and supply blocks feeds into the monetary policy 
block, as indicated by the dashed lines. The equation in that 












rate, usually as a function of inflation and real activity. This 
reflects the tendency of central banks to raise the short-term 
interest rate when the economy is overheating as well as when 
inflation rises and to lower it in the presence of economic slack. 
By adjusting the nominal interest rate, monetary policy in turn 
affects real activity and through it inflation, as represented by 
the line flowing from the monetary policy block to the demand 
block and then to the supply block. The policy rule therefore 
closes the circle, giving us a complete model of the relationship 
between three key endogenous variables: output  , inflation 
, and the nominal interest rate  . 
While this brief description appears static, one of the 
fundamental features of DSGE models is the dynamic 
interaction between the blocks—hence, the “dynamic” aspect 
of the DSGE label—in the sense that expectations about the 
future are a crucial determinant of today’s outcomes. These 
expectations are pinned down by the same mechanism that 
generates outcomes today. Therefore, output and inflation 
tomorrow, and thus their expectations as of today, depend on 
monetary policy tomorrow in the same way as they do today—
of course, taking into account what will happen from then 
on into the infinite future. 
The diagram highlights the role of expectations and the 
dynamic connections between the blocks that they create. 
The influence of expectations on the economy is represented by 
the arrows, which flow from monetary policy to the demand 
and then the supply block, where output and inflation are 
determined. This is to emphasize that the conduct of monetary 
policy has a large influence on the formation of expectations. 
In fact, in DSGE models, expectations are the main channel 
through which policy affects the economy, a feature that is 
consistent with the close attention paid by financial markets 
and the public to the pronouncements of central banks on their 
likely course of action. 
The last component of DSGE models captured in the 
diagram is their stochastic nature. Every period, random 
exogenous events perturb the equilibrium conditions in each 
block, injecting uncertainty in the evolution of the economy 
Y 
  i 
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DSGE models is the dynamic interaction 
between the [three interrelated] blocks—
hence, the “dynamic” aspect of the DSGE 
label—in the sense that expectations 
about the future are a crucial determinant 
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and thus generating economic fluctuations. Without these 
shocks, the economy would evolve along a perfectly predictable 
path, with neither booms nor recessions. We represent these 
shocks as triangles, with arrows pointing toward the 
equilibrium conditions on which they directly impinge. Mark-
up and productivity shocks, for example, affect the pricing and 
production decisions of firms that underlie the supply block, 
while demand shocks capture changes in the willingness of 
households to purchase the goods produced by those firms. 
3. Microfoundations of a Simple 
DSGE Model
We present the microfoundations of a small DSGE model that 
is simple enough to fit closely into the stylized structure 
outlined in our diagram. Our objective is to describe the basic 
components of DSGE models from a more formal perspective, 
using the mathematical language of economists, but avoiding 
unnecessary technical details. Despite its simplicity, our model 
is rich enough to provide a satisfactory empirical account of the 
evolution of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate in 
the United States in the last twenty years, as we discuss in the 
next section. 
Given the constraints we impose on this treatment for the 
sake of simplicity, our model lacks many features that are 
standard in the DSGE models that central banks typically use. 
For example, we ignore the process of capital accumulation, 
which would add another dimension—investment decisions 
by firms—to the economy’s demand block. Nor do we attempt 
to model the labor market in detail: for example, we make no 
distinction between the number of hours worked by each 
employee and the number of people at work, an issue that is 
hard to overlook in a period with unemployment close to 
10 percent. Finally, we exclude any impediment to the smooth 
functioning of financial markets and assume that the central 
bank can perfectly control the short-term interest rate—the 
only relevant rate of return in the economy. The 2008 financial 
crisis has proved that this set of assumptions can fail miserably 
in some circumstances and has highlighted the need for a 
more nuanced view of financial markets within the current 
generation of DSGE models, as we observe in our introduction. 
3.1. The Model Economy
Our model economy is populated by four classes of agents: 
a representative household, a representative final-good-
producing firm (f-firm), a continuum of intermediate firms 
(i-firms) indexed by  , and a monetary authority. The 
household consumes the final good and works for the i-firms. 
Each of these firms is a monopolist in the production of a 
particular intermediate good  , for which it is thus able to 
set the price. The f-firm packages the differentiated goods 
produced by the i-firms and sells the product to households in 
a competitive market. The monetary authority sets the nominal 
interest rate. 
The remainder of this section describes the problem faced 
by each economic agent, shows the corresponding optimi-
zation conditions, and interprets the shocks that perturb these 
conditions. These optimization conditions result in dynamic 
relationships among macroeconomic variables that define the 
three model blocks described above. Together with market 
clearing conditions, these relationships completely characterize 
the equilibrium behavior of the model economy. 
3.2. Households and the Aggregate 
Demand Block
At the core of the demand side of virtually all DSGE models 
is a negative relationship between the real interest rate and 
desired spending. In our simple model, the only source of 
spending is consumption. Therefore, the negative relationship 
between the interest rate and demand emerges from the 
consumption decision of households. 
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We model this decision as stemming from the optimal 
choice of a very large representative household—the entire 
U.S. population—which maximizes its expected discounted 
lifetime utility, looking forward from an arbitrary date 
               
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
               ,
for  , and given  . The members of this 
household, we call them “Americans,” like consumption,  , 
but dislike the number of hours they spend at work,  , to 
an extent described by the convex function  . The utility 
flow from consumption depends on current as well as past 
consumption, with a coefficient  . As a result of this “habit,” 
consumers are unhappy if their current consumption is low, 
but also if it falls much below the level of their consumption in 
the recent past. To afford consumption, Americans work a 
certain amount of hours   in each of the i-firms, where they 
earn an hourly nominal wage   which they take as given 
when deciding how much to work.5 With the income thus 
earned, they can purchase the final good at price   or save by 
accumulating one-period discount government bonds  , 
whose gross rate of return between   and   is  . 
From the perspective of time  , the household discounts 
utility in period   by a time-varying factor  , where 
 is an exogenous stochastic process. Changes in   
represent shocks to the household’s impatience. When    
increases relative to  , for example, the household cares more 
about the future and thus wishes to save more and consume 
less today, everything else equal. In this respect,   acts as 
a traditional demand shock, which affects desired consumption 
and saving exogenously. A persistent increase in   is one 
way of interpreting the current macroeconomic situation in the 
United States, in which households have curtailed their 
consumption—partly to build their savings. Of course, in 
reality there are many complex reasons behind this observed 
change in behavior, and an increase in people’s concern about 
the future is surely one of them. For simplicity, the model 
focuses on this one reason exclusively. 
5 In equilibrium, the wage—and thus the number of hours worked—will settle 
at the level at which the supply of labor by the household equals the demand of 
labor by firms. This labor demand in turn is determined by the need of firms 
to hire enough workers to satisfy the demand for their products, as we describe 
in the next section.
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To find the solution to the optimal problem above, we form 
the Lagrangian
                
                              
                 
                 ,
with first-order conditions 
(3.1a)                      : 
(3.1b)         :  .
for   and 
(3.2)                        : 
for   and  , together with the 
sequence of budget constraints. 
These conditions yield a fully state-contingent plan for the 
household’s choice variables—how much to work, consume, 
and save in the form of bonds—looking forward from the 
planning date   and into the foreseeable future. At any point 
in time, the household is obviously uncertain about the way 
in which this future will unfold. However, we assume that the 
household is aware of the kind of random external events, or 
shocks, that might affect its decisions and, crucially, that it 
knows the probability with which these shocks might occur. 
Therefore, the household can form expectations about future 
outcomes, which are one of the inputs in its current choices. 
We assume that these expectations are rational, meaning that 
they are based on the same knowledge of the economy and of 
the shocks that buffet it as that of the economist constructing 
the model. We use the notation   to denote 
expectations formed at time   of any future variable  , 
as in equations 3.1, for example. The optimal plan, then, 
is a series of instructions on how to behave in response to the 
realization of each shock, given expectations about the future, 
rather than a one-time decision on exactly how much to 
work, consume, and save on each future date. 
Together, the optimality conditions in equations 3.1 
establish the negative relationship between the interest rate and 
desired consumption that defines the demand side of the 
model. The nature of this relationship is more transparent in 
the special case of no habit in consumption ( ), when we 
LE t0
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can combine the two equations to obtain
(3.3)                 .
According to this so-called Euler equation, desired 
consumption decreases when the (gross) real interest rate
 increases, when expected future consumption
decreases, and when households become more patient 
(  rises). 
A log-linear approximation of the Euler equation (3.3), 
after some manipulation, gives
(3.4)              ,
where   is the quarterly inflation rate,   
is the continuously compounded nominal interest rate, 
 is a transformation of the demand shock, 
and   is the logarithm of total output. In this 
expression, we can substitute consumption of the final good   
with its output   because in our model consumption is the 
only source of demand for the final good. Therefore, market 
clearing implies  .
In this framework, equation 3.4 is similar to a traditional IS 
equation, since it describes the relationship between aggregate 
activity   and the ex ante real interest rate  , which 
must hold for the final-good market to clear. Unlike a 
traditional IS relationship, though, this equation is dynamic 
and forward looking, as it involves current and future expected 
variables. In particular, it establishes a link between current 
output and the entire future expected path of real interest rates, 
as we see by solving the equation forward
(3.5)           .
Through this channel, expectations of future monetary policy 
directly affect current economic conditions. In fact, this 
equation shows that future interest rates are just as important 
to determine today’s output as the current level of the short-
term rate, as we describe in our discussion of the role of policy 
expectations. 
In our full model, the Euler equation is somewhat more 
complicated than in equation 3.4 because of the consumption 
habit ( ), which is a source of richer, and more realistic, 
output dynamics in response to changes in the interest rate. 
Nevertheless, these more intricate dynamics do not change the 
qualitative nature of the relationship between real rates and 
demand. 
The third first-order condition of the household 
optimization problem, equation 3.2, represents the labor 
supply decision. It says that Americans are willing to work 
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wages are higher, at least for differences in wages modest 
enough to have no significant effect on their income.6 Large 
wage changes, in fact, would trigger an income effect and 
lead the now richer workers to curtail their labor supply. 
Mathematically, workers with higher income could afford 
more consumption, which would lead to a drop in the marginal 
utility   and thus to a decrease in labor supply at any given 
wage level. 
We can think of the labor supply schedule (equation 3.2) 
as a relationship determining the wage that firms must pay 
to induce Americans to work a certain number of hours. 
In prosperous times, when demand is high and firms are 
producing much, firms require their labor force to work long 
hours and they must correspondingly pay higher hourly wages. 
This is an important consideration in the production and 
pricing decisions of firms, as we discuss in the next section. 
3.3. Firms and the Aggregate Supply Block
The supply block of a DSGE model describes how firms set 
their prices as a function of the level of demand they face. Recall 
that in prosperous times, demand is high and firms must pay 
their workers higher wages. As a result, their costs increase as 
do their prices. In the aggregate, this generates a positive 
relationship between inflation and real activity. 
In terms of microfoundations, establishing this relationship 
requires some work, since firms must have some monopoly 
power to set prices. This is why our production structure 
includes a set of monopolistic i-firms, which set prices, as well 
as an f-firm, which simply aggregates the output of the i-firm 
into the final consumption good. Because all the pricing action 
occurs within the i-firms, we focus on their problem and omit 
that of the f-firm. 
Intermediate firm   hires   units of labor of type   on 
a competitive market to produce   units of intermediate 
good   with the technology 
(3.6)                              ,
where   represents the overall efficiency of the production 
process. We assume that   follows an exogenous stochastic 
process, whose random fluctuations over time capture the 
unexpected changes in productivity often experienced by 
modern economies—for example, the productivity boom in 
the mid-1990s that followed the mass adoption of information 
technology. We call this process an aggregate productivity shock, 
since it is common to all firms. 
6 Labor supply is upward sloping because   is an increasing function, as   is 
convex. In other words, people dislike working an extra hour more intensely 
when they are already working a lot rather than when they are working little.
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The market for intermediate goods is monopolistically 
competitive, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), so firms set prices 
subject to the requirement that they satisfy the demand for 
their good. This demand comes from the f-firm and takes 
the form
(3.7)                          ,
where   is the price of good   and   is the elasticity of 
demand. When the relative price of good   increases, its 
demand falls relative to aggregate demand by an amount 
that depends on  .
Moreover, we assume that firms change their prices only 
infrequently. The fact that firms do not adjust prices 
continuously, but leave them unchanged in some cases for long 
periods of time, should be familiar from everyday experience 
and is well established in the economic literature (for example, 
Bils and Klenow [2004]; Nakamura and Steinsson [2008]). To 
model this fact, we follow Calvo (1983) and assume that in 
every period only a fraction   of firms is free to reset its 
price while the remaining  fraction maintains its old price.7 
The subset of firms that are able to set an optimal price at  , 
call it  , maximize the discounted stream of expected 
future profits, taking into account that   periods from now 
there is a probability   that they will be forced to retain the 
price chosen today. The objective function of each of these 
firms is therefore 
      
for all  , subject to the production function 3.6 and to the 
additional constraint that they must satisfy the demand for 
their product at every point in time
(3.8)                    ,
for  . Profits, which are given by total revenue 
at the price chosen today,   minus total costs 
, are discounted by the multiplier  , 
sometimes called a stochastic discount factor, which translates 
dollar profits in the future into a current dollar value. 
The first-order condition of this optimization problem is
(3.9) ,
for all  , where   denotes the optimal price chosen by 
firm  ,   is the firm’s nominal marginal cost at time
, and   is its desired mark-up—the mark-up
7 In our estimated model in Section 5, we actually assume that the   fraction 
of firms that cannot choose their price freely can in fact adjust it in part to catch 
up with recent inflation. This assumption improves the model’s ability to fit the 
data on inflation, but it would complicate our presentation of the model’s 
microfoundations without altering its basic message.
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it would charge if prices were flexible. As rational monopolists, 
optimizing firms set their price as a mark-up over their 
marginal cost. However, this relationship holds in expected 
present discounted value, rather than every period, since a 
price chosen at time   will still be in effect with probability   
in period  . 
We can rewrite the marginal cost of a firm that at time   
is still forced to retain the price   as
(3.10)      
                              ,
where we use the labor supply relation 3.2 to substitute for the 
wage as well as the production function 3.6 and the demand 
function 3.8 to give us an expression for the labor demand 
.8 Inserting this expression into the first-order 
condition 3.9, we see that the solution to the optimal pricing 
problem is the same for all firms in the set  , since it depends 
only on the aggregate variables  . 
We denote this common optimal price as  .
The equation for the desired mark-up— , also
known as Lerner’s formula—says that monopolists facing a 
more rigid demand optimally charge a higher mark-up, and 
thus higher prices, since their clients are less sensitive to 
changes in the latter. We assume that this sensitivity—the 
elasticity of demand—and thus the desired mark-up, follows 
an exogenous stochastic process. Positive realizations of this 
desired mark-up shock, which correspond to a fall in the 
elasticity of demand, represent an increase in firms’ market 
power, to which they respond by increasing their price. 
Equation 3.9, together with the definition of the aggregate 
price level as a function of newly set prices   and of the past 
price index 
                     
yields an approximate New Keynesian Phillips curve—a 
relationship between current inflation, future expected 
inflation, and real marginal cost—of the form
(3.11)                      ,
where   is a transformation of the mark-up shock 
and   is the logarithm of the real marginal cost.9 
The sensitivity of inflation to changes in the marginal cost,  , 
depends on the frequency of price adjustment  , as well as on
8 These substitutions are equivalent to “solving” for equilibrium in the labor 
market.
9 Variables are in logarithms, because equation 3.11, like equation 3.4, is 
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other structural parameters, according to  ,
where   is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
work, while   is the average value of the elasticity of demand  .
  This Phillips curve, together with the expression for 
marginal costs (3.10), provides the relationship between 
inflation and real activity that defines the supply block of the 
model. In fact, we see from equation 3.10 that marginal cost 
depends on the level of aggregate activity, among other factors. 
Higher economic activity leads to higher wages and marginal 
costs. Thus, firms increase their prices, boosting aggregate 
inflation. 
Another important feature of the Phillips curve is that it is 
forward looking, just as the Euler equation in the previous 
section is. As in that case, therefore, we can iterate equation 
3.11 forward to obtain
                        ,
which highlights how inflation today really depends on the 
entire future expected path of marginal costs, and through 
those, of real activity. But this path depends in turn on 
expectations about interest rates, and thus on the entire future 
course of monetary policy, as equation 3.5 shows. Hence, 
we have the crucial role of policy expectations for the 
determination of current economic outcomes in this model, 
a feature we discuss in Section 2. 
Monetary Policy
Recall that when the interest rate—current and expected—is 
low, people demand more consumption goods (equation 3.5). 
But if demand is high, firms’ marginal costs increase and so do 
their prices. The end result is inflation. The opposite is true 
when the interest rate is high. But where does the interest rate 
come from? In DSGE models, as in the real world, the short-
term interest rate is set by monetary policy. In practice, this is a 
decision made by a committee (the Federal Reserve’s Federal 
Open Market Committee, or FOMC) using various inputs: 
large data sets, projections from several models, and the 
judgment of policymakers. Despite the apparent complexity of 
the process, Taylor (1993) famously demonstrated that it can 
be reasonably well approximated by assuming that the Federal 
Reserve raises the federal funds rate when inflation and/or 
output is “high” with respect to some baseline. This behavior is 
assumed in almost all variants of DSGE models, although the 
definition of the appropriate baselines is somewhat 
controversial. 
In our model, we assume that interest rates are set according 
to the policy rule 
 1  –  1  – 












(3.12)    
                                    ,
where  ,  , and   are the baselines for the real interest rate, 
inflation, and output, respectively, and   is 
the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters. The 
monetary policy shock  , a random variable with mean zero, 
captures any deviation of the observed nominal interest rate 
from the value suggested by the rule. This rule implies that, 
if inflation and output rise above their baseline levels, the 
nominal interest rate is lifted over time above its own baseline, 
, by amounts dictated by the parameters   and   and 
at a speed that depends on the coefficient  . The higher policy 
rate, which is expected to persist even after output and inflation 
have returned to normal, exerts a restraining force on the 
economy—curbing demand, marginal costs, and inflation. In 
this respect,   and   can be regarded as targets of monetary 
policy—the levels of inflation and output that the central bank 
considers consistent with its mandate—and therefore do not 
elicit either a restrictive or a stimulative policy. 
In equation 3.12, we denote the central bank’s objective in 
terms of production as  , the “efficient” level of output. This 
unobserved variable can be derived from the microfoundations 
of the model.10 It represents the level of output that would 
prevail in the economy if we could eliminate at once all 
distortions—namely, force the i-firms to behave competitively 
rather than as monopolists and allow them to change their 
prices freely. The level of activity that would result from such 
a situation is ideal from the perspective of the representative 
household in the model, as its name suggests. This is what 
makes it a suitable target for monetary policy. However, 
when output is at its efficient level, inflation is not stable, as 
policymakers would like it to be, but fluctuates because of 
the presence of mark-up shocks. This is the essence of the 
monetary policy trade-offs in the economy. Achieving the 
10 The precise mathematical definition of efficient output in the model is 
irrelevant for our purposes. We present in Section 4 an estimate of the behavior 
of this variable over the last twenty years.
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When output is at its efficient level, 
inflation is not stable, as policymakers 
would like it to be, but fluctuates because 
of the presence of mark-up shocks. This 
is the essence of the monetary policy 
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efficient level of output requires undesirable movements in 
inflation. In contrast, a stable inflation implies deviations from 
the efficient level of output. The two objectives cannot be 
reconciled, but must be traded off of each other. 
Related to the efficient level of output is the efficient real 
interest rate,  , which is the rate of return we would observe 
in the efficient economy described above. This definition 
implies that, when the actual real interest rate is at its efficient 
level and is expected to remain there in the future, output will 
also be at its efficient level. This is why we include   in our 
definition 
of the baseline interest rate. 
The other component of this baseline rate is the inflation 
target  . We allow this target to vary slowly over time to 
accommodate the fact that inflation hovered at about 4 percent 
for a few years around 1990 before declining to nearly 2 percent 
after the recession that ended in 1991. Nominal interest rates 
were correspondingly higher in the first period, thus implying 
a stable average for the real interest rate. We now present our 
estimate of the evolution of the inflation target. 
4. Empirical Approach 
and Estimation Results
We estimate our model using data on the growth rate of real 
GDP to measure output growth,  , the growth rate of the 
personal consumption expenditures chain price index 
excluding food and energy (core PCE) to measure inflation,  , 
and the quarterly average of the monthly effective federal funds 
rate to measure the nominal interest rate,  . We measure 
inflation by core PCE, rather than by a more comprehensive 
measure, because the monetary policy debate in the United 
States tends to focus on this index. 
Our data span the period 1984:1 to 2007:4 (Chart 1). This is 
the longest possible data set over which it is reasonable to argue 
that U.S. monetary policy can be represented by a stable 
interest rate rule. It follows the period of extremely high 
interest rates in the early 1980s that brought inflation under 
control. However, in the first few years of this sample, inflation 
and the federal funds rate were still relatively high, with a fairly 
abrupt reduction taking place around the 1991 recession. We 
capture this low-frequency movement in inflation and the 
nominal interest rate by including the slow-moving inflation 
target   in the policy rule. 
We use Bayesian methods to characterize the posterior 
distribution of the parameters of the model. This distribution 
combines the model’s likelihood function with prior 










example, by An and Schorfheide (2007).11 A discussion of these 
methods is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we focus on 
the implications of these estimates for some key properties of 
the model. Our objective is to show that the estimated model 
provides a good fit to the data across many dimensions, but 
also to highlight some of the model’s most notable 
shortcomings. 
4.1. Moment Comparisons
We compare the second moments implied by the estimated 
model with those measured in the data. Table 1 presents the 
standard deviations of the observable variables, reported as 
annualized percentages. In the model column, we report the 
median and 5th and 95th percentiles of the standard deviations 
across draws from the model’s posterior. This interval reflects 
the uncertainty on the structural parameters—and thus on 
the model-implied moments—encoded in the parameters’ 
posterior distribution. In the data column, we report the 
median and 5th and 95th percentiles of the empirical standard 
deviations in the data. This interval represents the uncertainty 
on the true empirical moments because of the small sample 
available for their estimation. 
Our model does a very good job replicating the volatilities in 
the data. It captures the standard deviation of output growth 
and replicates quite closely the volatility of the nominal interest 
rate, although it overestimates the standard deviation of 
11 The technical appendix provides information on the priors for the 
parameters.32 Policy Analysis Using DSGE Models: An Introduction
inflation. The ability of the model to accurately reproduce the 
volatility of the observable variables is not a preordained 
conclusion, even if we freely estimate the standard deviations 
of the shocks. The reason is that a likelihood-based estimator 
tries to match the entire autocovariance function of the data, 
and thus must strike a balance between matching standard 
deviations and all the other second moments—namely, 
autocorrelations and cross-correlations. 
These other moments are displayed in Chart 2. The black 
line represents the model-implied correlation, with the shaded 
area representing a 90 percent posterior interval. The solid blue 
line is instead the correlation measured in the data, with a 
90 percent bootstrap interval around this estimate represented 
by the dashed lines. The serial correlation of output growth in 
the model is very close to its empirical counterpart and well 
within the data-uncertainty band. For inflation and the interest 
rate, the model serial correlations are on the high end of the 
band. This excessive persistence is a result of the low-frequency 
component in both variables associated with the inflation 
target, as we can infer from the variance decomposition 
in Table 2. 
According to the model, shocks to the inflation target 
account for 85 percent of the unconditional variance of 
inflation and 38 percent of that of the nominal interest rate. 
Although we do not calculate a variance decomposition by 
frequency, we know that the contribution of the inflation target 
shock is concentrated at low frequencies, since this shock is 
very persistent (the posterior mean of its autocorrelation 
coefficient is 0.98). This finding suggests that the model faces 
a trade-off between accommodating the downward drift in 
inflation in the first part of our sample and providing a more 
balanced account of the sources of inflation variability. 
The rest of the variance decomposition accords well with 
conventional wisdom. The productivity shock plays an 
important role in accounting for the volatility of output 
growth, although the demand shock and the monetary policy 
shocks (interest rate plus inflation target) are also non-
negligible. Moreover, the demand shock accounts for more 
than half of the variance of the nominal interest rate. Finally, 
mark-up shocks play a minor role as sources of volatility. 
This finding has potentially important policy implications, 
since in the model mark-up shocks are the only source of 
the aforementioned policy trade-off between inflation and 
real activity. 
Returning now to the cross-correlations in Chart 2, we see 
that the model is quite successful in capturing the lead-lag 
relationships in the data. In our sample, there is no statistically 
significant predictability of future inflation through current 
output growth, a pattern that is reproduced by the model. The 
Table 1
Model-Implied and Empirical Standard Deviations 
Percent
Variable Model Data
GDP growth 2.03 2.03
[1.79, 2.37] [1.74, 2.27]
Core PCE inflation 1.41 1.15
[0.98, 2.40] [0.67, 1.38]
Federal funds rate 2.23 2.46
[1.61, 3.56] [1.55, 2.94]
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table reports the standard deviations of the observable 
variables. The model-implied standard deviations are medians across 
draws from the posterior; the 5th and 95th posterior percentiles across 
those same draws are in brackets. The empirical standard deviations are 
medians across bootstrap replications of a VAR(4) fit to the data; the 
5th and 95th percentiles across those same replications are in brackets. 
PCE is personal consumption expenditures.
Our model does a very good job 
replicating the volatilities in the data. 
It captures the standard deviation of 
output growth and replicates quite closely 
the volatility of the nominal interest rate, 
although it overestimates the standard 
deviation of inflation.
According to the model, shocks to the 
inflation target account for 85 percent of 
the unconditional variance of inflation and 
38 percent of that of the nominal interest 
rate. This finding suggests that the model 
faces a trade-off between accommodating 
the downward drift in inflation in the first 
part of our sample and providing a more 
balanced account of the sources of 




Notes: The black line represents the median model-implied correlation across draws from the posterior; the shaded area represents the interval between 
the 5th and 95th percentiles across those same draws. The solid blue line represents the median autocorrelation across bootstrap replications of a VAR(4) 
fit to the data; the dashed blue lines represent the interval between the 5th and 95th percentiles across those same replications. Each statistic is calculated 
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model also reproduces the positive correlation between 
inflation and the nominal interest rate present in the data both 
in the leads and in the lags (the middle right panel of the chart). 
The positive correlation between current interest rates and 
future inflation might seem puzzling at first. We would expect 
higher interest rates to bring inflation down over time, which 
should make the correlation negative. However, over our 
sample, this negative relationship is confounded by the low-
frequency positive comovement between inflation and the 
nominal interest rate induced by the Fisher effect. Recall that 
inflation and the nominal interest rate in fact are persistently 
above their unconditional sample average over the first third 
of the sample and are persistently below it after about 1992. 
The bottom right panel of Chart 2 reports the dynamic 34 Policy Analysis Using DSGE Models: An Introduction
correlation between output growth and the nominal interest 
rate. In the data, high growth rates of output predict high 
nominal interest rates one to two years ahead, but this 
predictability is much less pronounced in the model. 
Moreover, this discrepancy is statistically significant in the 
sense that the model-implied median autocorrelation lies 
outside the 90 percent bootstrap interval computed from the 
data. This failure to match the data highlights the main 
empirical weakness of our model: its demand-side 
specification. As in most of the DSGE literature, our demand 
block consists of the Euler equation of a representative 
consumer. Standard specifications of a Euler equation of the 
type adopted here provide an inaccurate description of the 
observed relationship between the growth rate of consumption 
(or output, as in our case) and financial returns, including 
interest rates, as first documented by Hansen and Singleton 
(1982, 1983) and subsequently confirmed by many others (see 
Campbell [2003] for a review). Improving the performance of 
the current generation of DSGE models in this dimension 
would be an important priority for future research. 
We now report our estimates of a few of the variables that 
play an important role in the model, but that are not directly 
observable. We focus on the three latent variables that enter 
the interest rate rule: the inflation target  , the output gap 
, and the efficient real interest rate   (Chart 3). As in 
Charts 1 and 2, the black line is the median estimate across 
draws from the model’s posterior and the shaded area 
represents a 90 percent posterior probability interval. 
Starting from the top panel, we note that the estimated 
inflation target captures well the step-down in inflation from 
a local mean above 4 percent between 1984 and 1991 to an 
average value of around 2 percent since 1994. This permanent 





disinflation process initiated by Federal Reserve Chairman 
Volcker in 1979, which became known as an example of 
opportunistic disinflation (Orphanides and Wilcox 2002). 
Needless to say, the estimated target is not completely smooth, 
but it also displays some higher frequency variation. For 
example, it reaches a minimum of around 1 percent at the 
beginning of 2003, but moves closer to 2 percent over 2004. 
(The next section studies in more detail the implications of 
these movements.) 
The middle and bottom panels of Chart 3 report estimates 
of the output gap—the percentage deviation of output from its 
efficient level—and of the efficient real interest rate. Several 
features of the estimated output gap are noteworthy. First, its 
two deepest negative troughs correspond to the two recessions 
in our sample. In this respect, our model-based output gap 
conforms well with more conventional measures of this 
variable, such as the one produced by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO). However, the shortfall of output from its 
efficient level is never larger than 0.7 percent, even in these 
recessionary episodes. By comparison, the CBO output gap is 
as low as -3.2 percent in 1991. The amplitude of the business 
cycle fluctuations in our estimated output gap is small because 
the efficient level of output is a function of all the shocks in the 
model and therefore it tracks actual output quite closely. The 
last notable feature of the efficient output gap is that it displays 
a very pronounced volatility at frequencies higher than the 
business cycle. During the 1990s expansion, for example, it 
crosses the zero line about a dozen times. 
Compared with the output gap, the efficient real rate is 
significantly smoother. Although some high-frequency 
variation remains, the behavior of the efficient real rate is 
dominated by swings at the business cycle frequency. The rate 





Variable Demand Productivity Mark-Up Interest Rate Inflation Target
GDP growth 0.20 0.56 0.07 0.04 0.13
[.13, .28] [.45, .67] [.04, .10] [.02, .06] [.07, .19]
Core PCE inflation 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.85
[.01, .06] [.00, .02] [.04, .17] [.00, .01] [.76, .94]
Federal funds rate 0.54 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.38
[.32, .76] [.00, .13] [.00, .02] [.01, .02] [.16, .61]
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table reports the share of the unconditional variance of each observable variable contributed by each shock. The point estimates are medians 
across draws from the posterior; the 5th and 95th posterior percentiles across those same draws are in brackets. PCE is personal consumption expenditures.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 35
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the relevant latent variable conditional on the posterior mean of the 
parameters; the shaded area represents the interval between the 5th 
and 95th percentiles of the Kalman smoother estimates across draws 
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recessions and recovers a few quarters into the expansions. It is 
interesting to note that the efficient real rate was negative for 
the entire period between 2001 and 2004—a time when the 
FOMC was concerned about the possibility that the U.S. 
economy would fall into a liquidity trap.12 A negative efficient 
real interest rate is a necessary condition for the zero bound on 
nominal interest rates to become binding, and hence for the 
liquidity trap to become a problem. 
12 A liquidity trap describes a situation in which nominal interest rates have 
reached their zero lower bound, as in Japan in the 1990s, and therefore cannot 
be lowered any further.
5.T h e  M o d e l  a t  W o r k :  T h e  P i c k u p  
in Inflation in the First Half 
of 2004
To show how our model can be used to address specific policy 
questions, we examine a particular historical episode: the 
puzzling pickup in inflation in the first half of 2004. This 
exercise allows us to illustrate how we use the model’s forecasts 
to construct alternative scenarios for counterfactual policy 
analysis. Moreover, our analysis offers potentially interesting 
lessons for the current situation—although inflation has 
recently been quite low, there has been some concern that 
it might accelerate in the near future. 
After approaching levels close to 1 percent between 2002 
and 2003, core PCE inflation started moving higher in mid-
2003. This pickup accelerated significantly in the first half 
of 2004, when (year-over-year) core inflation moved from 
about 1.5 percent to more than 2 percent, where it remained 
until the end of 2008. We use our DSGE model to analyze 
the sources of this unusually rapid and persistent step-up in 
the level of inflation. 
We organize our discussion around three questions. First, 
was the surge in inflation forecastable? As we will see, the 
answer to this question is no, at least from the perspective of 
our model. Second, what accounts for the discrepancy between 
the model’s forecast and the observed paths of inflation, output 
growth, and the federal funds rate? Third, could monetary 
policy have achieved a smooth transition to inflation rates 
below 2 percent and, if so, at what cost in terms of added 
volatility in output and the interest rate? 
Chart 4 presents forecasts of quarterly core PCE inflation, 
real GDP growth, and the federal funds rate from the DSGE 
model. The forecast starts in 2003:1, when quarterly inflation 
reached 1.1 percent (at an annual rate)—its lowest level 
following the 2001 recession—and extends through the 
beginning of 2005. In each panel, the dashed line represents 
To show how our model can be used to 
address specific policy questions, we 
examine a particular historical episode: 
the puzzling pickup in inflation in the first 
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Chart 4













Notes: The dashed line represents the forecast of the relevant variable 
conditional on the posterior mean of the parameters; the solid line 
represents the observed realization. The shaded areas represent 
50 (light blue), 75 (medium blue), and 90 percent (dark blue) 
symmetric probability intervals for the forecast at each horizon. 












the expected value of the forecast, while the bands show the 
50 (light blue), 75 (medium blue), and 90 (dark blue) percent 
probability intervals. The solid line shows the realized data. 
The model performs well in its forecast of output and the 
federal funds rate, especially in the medium term. Inflation, 
by comparison, is close to the mean forecast in 2003, but is 
well above it in 2004 and beyond. Moreover, the probability 
intervals for the forecast suggest that this realization of 
inflation was quite unusual, as we see from the fact that the 
solid line borders the 75 percent probability interval in the first 
half of 2004. This means that in 2003:1, the model would have 
assessed only about one in ten chances (12.5 percent) of 
inflation being as high as it was in that period. 
From an economic perspective, it is interesting to note that 
these sizable forecast errors for inflation roughly correspond to 
the “considerable period” era that extended from June 2003 to 
June 2004. At that time, the FOMC kept the federal funds rate 
constant at 1 percent to guard against the risk of deflation, 
while indicating in its statement that “policy accommodation 
can be maintained for a considerable period.”13 According to 
the model’s projection, this path for the federal funds rate 
represents a deviation from the policy stance historically 
maintained by the Federal Reserve in similar macroeconomic 
circumstances. Based on the estimated interest rate rule, in fact, 
the DSGE predicts a slow rise in the interest rate over 2003 and 
2004. Instead, the FOMC maintained the federal funds rate at 
1 percent through the first half of 2004. 
However, the pickup in inflation over this period is 
significantly more “unusual” than the deviation of the federal 
funds rate from the historical norm. Actual inflation in 2004 is 
mostly outside the 50 percent probability interval of the model 
forecast (the light blue band), while the actual federal funds 
rate remains well within it. Moreover, the acceleration in 
inflation is not accompanied by unexpectedly high real growth, 
suggesting that it cannot be fully explained by the traditional 
channel of transmission from an overheated economy to 
higher inflation. 
What else, then, accounts for the unexpected and unlikely 
deviation of inflation from the model’s forecast over 2004? 
The DSGE framework provides a particularly useful way of 
addressing this question. As we discuss in Section 2, the 
economic outcomes predicted by the model—the levels of 
inflation, output, and the interest rate—are the result of the 
endogenous responses of the agents in the economy to the 
13 This formulation was maintained in the FOMC statement from August 2003 
to December 2003, and was later substituted with “policy accommodation can 
be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.”
The DSGE forecast is just a description of 
what would happen to the variables of 
interest if we allowed the model economy 
to “run” from its initial condition, without 
introducing any innovations. Any observed 
deviation from the forecast, therefore, 
must be attributable to the realization of a 




Notes: The dashed line represents the forecast of the relevant shock conditional on the posterior mean of the parameters while the solid line 
represents an estimate of the realization based on the Kalman smoother. The shaded area represents the 75 percent symmetric probability 






























realization of a set of exogenous processes, such as productivity 
or desired mark-ups. The innovations to these driving 
processes account for the deviations of the data from the 
model’s forecast. In fact, the DSGE forecast is just a description 
of what would happen to the variables of interest if we allowed 
the model economy to “run” from its initial condition, without 
introducing any innovations. Any observed deviation from the 
forecast, therefore, must be attributable to the realization of a 
particular combination of such innovations.14
Chart 5 depicts the combinations of exogenous driving 
processes that, according to the estimated DSGE model, are 
responsible for the observed path of inflation, output, and the 
interest rate over the period we analyze. In each panel, the 
dashed line represents the evolution of the shock associated 
with the mean forecast while the solid line represents the 
sequence of shocks corresponding to the actual realization of 
the observable variables. As in Chart 4, the medium blue band 
denotes the 75 percent probability interval for the forecast. 
14 In this study, we distinguish between exogenous driving processes—shocks, 
for short—and innovations. Driving processes can be autocorrelated, and thus 
forecastable, while their innovations are i.i.d.
The contribution of three shocks stands out. First, the 
demand shock recovers from almost -4 percent to around 
-1 percent. This movement is particularly pronounced during 
2004, when inflation was picking up. However, this profile 
is broadly consistent with the shock’s expected evolution, 
represented by the dashed line. The productivity shock is also 
broadly in line with expectations, with the exception of 2003:3; 
this spike in productivity accounts for the corresponding spike 
in output growth in that quarter. 
However, the most significant and direct contribution to the 
surge in inflation comes from a sizable upward movement in 
the inflation target,  . According to our estimates, this target 
moves by about 1 percentage point, from less than 1 percent to 
close to 2 percent. Moreover, this movement is at the edge of 
the 75 percent probability interval for the forecast, suggesting 
that the realization of this driving process is indeed quite 
unusual. 
To quantify more directly the effect on inflation of the 
unexpected increase in the implicit inflation target, we depict 
what would have happened to core PCE inflation in the 
absence of such an increase (Chart 6). Here, the solid line 
t38 Policy Analysis Using DSGE Models: An Introduction
Chart 6







Notes: The dashed line represents a forecast of inflation conditional on 
the Kalman smoother estimates of all shocks except for those to the 
inflation target; the solid line represents the observed realization. 
The shaded areas represent 50 (light blue), 75 (medium blue), and 
90 percent (dark blue) symmetric probability intervals for this 
conditional forecast. Therefore, they represent uncertainty stemming 
from future realizations of the inflation target shock alone. PCE is 
personal consumption expenditure.
Core PCE Inflation
is realized inflation. The dashed line represents the counter-
factual path of inflation predicted by the model in the absence 
of shocks to the inflation target. In other words, this is a 
forecast for inflation, conditional on the estimated path of all 
but the inflation target shock. The bands therefore represent 
the usual probability intervals, but in this case they are 
computed around this conditional forecast.
The chart confirms our conclusion on the role of 
innovations to the inflation target in accounting for the 
observed evolution of inflation. According to the model, core 
inflation would not have increased to above 2 percent, as it did 
for most of 2004, without the steady increase in the inflation 
target over the same period. In fact, inflation would have 
remained within the “comfort zone” of 1 to 2 percent. 
Moreover, note that the solid line of realized inflation is mostly 
inside the area associated with the 90 percent probability 
interval for the conditional forecast. This suggests that the 
share of the forecast error in inflation accounted for by the 
innovations in the inflation target in this episode is unusually 
large compared with the historical average. This is just a more 
formal way of saying that the increase in the inflation target is 
disproportionately responsible for the observed increase in 
inflation that we examine. 
The estimated rise in the implicit inflation target provides 
the missing link for a unified explanation of the pickup in 
inflation, the “considerable period” monetary policy, and the 
absence of a concomitant acceleration in output growth. In the 
model, the inflation target is the main driver of movements 
in inflation expectations, which are a key determinant of 
firms’ pricing behavior together with the amount of slack in 
the economy. According to the DSGE model, therefore, a 
significant fraction of the inflation acceleration in 2003-04 can 
be attributed to a change in inflation expectations, driven by an 
increase in the Federal Reserve’s implicit inflation target as 
perceived by the private sector. This increase in the perceived 
target in turn is consistent with the unusually loose stance 
of monetary policy maintained by the FOMC during the 
“considerable period” era. 
This brings us to the third question: If the DSGE model 
is correct, and the pickup in inflation in 2004 is attributable 
to an increase in the implicit inflation target perceived by 
the public, could the Federal Reserve have prevented this 
development? 
Charts 7 and 8 show the results of this counterfactual 
analysis. Both charts display the data (solid line) along with the 
counterfactual outcomes for the economy predicted by the 
model under a policy consistent with the stabilization of core 
inflation at 1.6 percent through 2004. The way in which this 
policy is implemented, however, is different in the two cases. In 
Chart 7, we present the outcomes associated with what we call 
a “no-communication” monetary strategy (dashed line) while 
in Chart 8 we compare these results with those that would 
emerge under a “full-communication” strategy (blue line). 
Under the no-communication strategy, the path for the 
interest rate compatible with the desired evolution of inflation 
is achieved each period through “surprise” departures from the 
historical rule. In contrast, under the full-communication 
strategy, the Federal Reserve implements the same path for 
inflation by announcing an inflation target that is consistent 
with it.15 
15 Technically, in both cases we choose shocks to the monetary policy rule 
that are compatible with the desired evolution of inflation, conditional on 
the smoothed value of all other disturbances. Under the no-communication 
strategy, the shocks we choose are the i.i.d. monetary shocks,  . Under 






According to the DSGE model . . . 
a significant fraction of the inflation 
acceleration in 2003-04 can be attributed 
to a change in inflation expectations, 
driven by an increase in the Federal 
Reserve’s implicit inflation target as 
















Notes: The dashed line represents the counterfactual evolution of the 
economy predicted by our model had monetary policy been set to 
achieve the path for inflation depicted in the top panel. This counter-
factual is conditional on the posterior mean of the parameters. Under 
the “no-communication” scenario, the desired path for inflation is 
achieved by the choice of the interest rate shock while all other shocks 
are set at their Kalman smoother estimate. The shaded area represents the 
75 percent symmetric probability interval for the unconditional forecast, 
which is the same as in Chart 4. The black line represents the observed 





























Notes: The blue line represents the counterfactual evolution of the 
economy predicted by our model had monetary policy been set to 
achieve the path for inflation depicted in the top panel. This counter-
factual is conditional on the posterior mean of the parameters. Under 
the “full-communication” scenario, the desired path for inflation is 
achieved by the choice of the inflation target while all other shocks are 
set at their Kalman smoother estimate. The shaded area represents the 
75 percent symmetric probability interval for the unconditional forecast, 
which is the same as in Chart 4. The black line represents the observed 
realization of each series. The dashed line is the conditional forecast 














The crucial difference between the results obtained under 
the two scenarios stems from the key role that expectations play 
in the DSGE model. Under the full-communication strategy, 
inflation expectations are immediately affected by the 
announcement of an inflation target. These expectations in 
turn have a direct effect on actual inflation without requiring a 
contraction in real activity to force businesses to contain their 
price increases. Under the no-communication strategy, 
inflation expectations remain at their historical level. As a 
result, inflation can be controlled only by increasing interest 
rates to contain GDP growth. 
The way in which we model the full-communication 
scenario is quite stark. In practice, expectations would be 
unlikely to adjust instantaneously, even if the Federal Reserve 40 Policy Analysis Using DSGE Models: An Introduction
were completely transparent about its inflation target. Never-
theless, the differences between the results of the two policy 
strategies are striking. In the no-communication case, inflation 
can be stabilized only through wild movements in the federal 
funds rate. As a result, GDP growth is also extremely volatile: 
it falls below zero in 2004:1, but then recovers to a quarterly 
(annualized) growth rate of 10 percent and ends the period 
at zero. These movements in output are indeed extreme. They 
lie well outside the 75 percent forecast probability interval 
reported in the chart. In fact, the quantitative details of the 
evolution of output and the interest rate under the counter-
factual simulations should not be taken literally, since they 
depend significantly on the details of the model and on the 
assumption that the central bank insists on perfectly stabilizing 
current inflation. However, the qualitative pattern of higher 
volatility under the no-communication strategy is a robust 
feature of models in which expectations matter. 
Under the full-communication strategy, in contrast, the 
desired path for inflation can be achieved with much less 
pronounced fluctuations in real growth and an almost 
unchanged policy relative to the actual path. Interest rates need 
not rise and output need not fall significantly because a shift in 
expectations brought about by clear communication of the 
Federal Reserve’s inflation objective largely brings inflation 
under control. 
Note that the results of these counterfactual exercises should 
be interpreted with caution. Their objective is not to prescribe 
an alternative to the policy followed in 2004, but rather to 
investigate how a different path for inflation might have been 
achieved. In fact, according to Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003), an increase in inflation expectations 
might be the best monetary strategy to escape a liquidity trap. 
Many have argued that the main objective of the Federal 
Reserve around 2003 was to minimize the U.S. economy’s 
likelihood of falling into such a trap.16 From this perspective, 
our analysis might be interpreted as supportive of the policy 
stance adopted by the central bank in 2003-04 as part of a 
successful preemptive strike against a liquidity trap. 
6. Conclusion
This article provides an introduction to dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models and presents an example of their 
use as tools for monetary policy analysis. Given the mainly 
educational nature of our presentation, we simplify by using 
a small-scale model designed to account for the behavior of 
three key macroeconomic variables: GDP growth, core PCE 
inflation, and the federal funds rate. Despite its simplicity, our 
model is rich enough to reproduce some of the salient features 
of the series of interest. It also allows us to highlight the 
components common to more articulated and realistic DSGE 
specifications. 
Our model offers insight into the causes of the abrupt pick-
up in inflation in the first half of 2004, from levels close to 
1 percent at the beginning of 2003 to values steadily above 
2 percent through the end of 2008. This exercise highlights the 
central role of expectations in the transmission of shocks and 
policy impulses in DSGE models. The main lesson that we 
derive from the exercise is that the most effective approach 
to controlling inflation is through the management of 
expectations, rather than through actual movements of the 
policy instrument. This lesson seems to be well understood by 
the public, given the amount of attention and speculation that 
usually surround the pronouncements of central bankers on 
their likely future actions. DSGE models have the potential 
to broaden this understanding by adding a quantitative 
assessment of the link between current policy, expectations, 
and economic outcomes—and thus to clarify the effect that 
different systematic approaches to policy have on those 
outcomes. 
16 In its August 2003 statement, the FOMC observed that “on balance, the risk 
of inflation becoming undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern 
for the foreseeable future.” Very low or negative levels of inflation are one of 
the most likely triggers of a liquidity trap.
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The table reports information on the prior distribution for 
the parameters of the model. Further details on the parameters 
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